



SPRINGBLUE ID - BLE/NFC IDENTIFICATION SOLUTION

Developer's Implementation Manual

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. ABSTRACT

SpringBlue ID is an innovative identification scheme, targeting smartphone applications, where a user's identification number is pushed securely to a SpringBlue ID-enabled Reader, either through NFC Host Card Emulation (HCE) or through Bluetooth Smart, *aka* BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy).

SpringBlue ID has been designed not only with security but also with privacy in mind: only the site owning a user ID is able to read it. SpringBlue ID opens numerous use cases related to user identification: physical access control, loyalty programs, car park, car sharing or bike sharing schemes, and more.

Illustration 1 depicts the actors of the SpringBlue ID solution. SpringCard offers the SpringBlue ID Reader, and specifies its interfaces with the SpringBlue ID Objects. Other parts of the system are the implementer's know-how and responsibility.




Illustration 1: Actors of the SpringBlue ID Solution

1.2. SCOPE

This document is the reference guide for developers who need to implement a SpringBlue ID Object in their smartphone application. It focuses on the SpringBlue ID data and on the secure transaction (blue arrow in Illustration 1).

1.3. AUDIENCE

This manual is designed for use by application developers. It assumes that the reader has expert knowledge of computer development and a basic knowledge of the BLE and NFC communication standards, and of the ISO 7816-4 standard for smartcards.

1.4. SUPPORT AND UPDATES

Useful related materials (product datasheets, application notes, sample software, HOWTOs and FAQs...) are available at SpringCard's web site:

www.springcard.com

Updated versions of this document and others are posted on this web site as soon as they are available.

For technical support enquiries, please refer to SpringCard support page, on the web at

www.springcard.com/support

2. TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

2.1. DEFINITIONS

For the purposes of the document, the following terms and definitions apply:

SpringBlue ID Reader or SBIR

An electronic device that implements the Reader part of the SpringBlue ID transaction, over BLE or NFC, or both.

SpringBlue ID Object or SBIO

A smartphone or any other mobile electronic device that stores a SpringBlue ID and implements the User part of the transaction. The Object is identified by a 16-byte pseudo-unique ObjectID.

Site An instance of the SpringBlue ID scheme, identified by a 4-byte SiteID. A SpringBlue ID Reader is only able to read UserIDs belonging to the same Site. The SiteID is attributed by SpringCard to its customers (one SiteID per customer or per installation depending on the use case).

User A user belonging to a Site, identified by a 8-byte UserID. The UserID is attributed by the implementer. The implementer shall ensure that the attributed UserIDs are unique within a Site.

2.2. ABBREVIATIONS

SOIK Site's ObjectID Key. The site-wide global AES key used to cipher the ObjectID between the SBIO and the SBIR.

OSUK Object + Site's UserID Key. The AES key used to cipher the UserID cryptogram between the SBIO and the SBIR. This key is specific to the object (and to the site).

MSUK Master Key to protect Site's UserIDs. The AES keys used to compute the OSUK for a given object (and site).

2.3. GLOSSARY

AES	Symbol for Advanced Encryption Standard (as defined in ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010), symmetrical cryptographic algorithm using 128-bit data and key.
ATR	Answer To Reset (data returned by a smart card during startup).
BLE	Bluetooth Low Energy, officially named “Bluetooth smart” – a subset of the Bluetooth 4.0 standard.
ECB	Electronic Codebook mode – refers to a single-block operation of a symmetrical cryptographic algorithm.
NFC	Near Field Communication – generic term covering the inductive communication over a 13.56MHz carrier, including ISO/IEC 14443.
PICC	Proximity Integrated-Circuit Card – the ISO/IEC 14443 term for “contactless card”.
PCD	Proximity Coupling Device – the ISO/IEC 14443 term for “contactless reader”.
RFU	Symbol for “Reserved for Future Use”.
SAM	Secure Application Module.
XOR	Exclusive-OR.

3. THE SPRINGBLUE TRANSACTION

3.1. BASIS

After the initial BLE/NFC discovery procedure (which will be detailed in the next chapters), The SpringBlue transaction relies on no more than 3 APDU (Illustration 2).




Illustration 2: The SpringBlue transaction

3.2. SELECT APPLICATION

On the SBIO's side, this 1st exchange allows the object's operating system to activate the application. The SpringBlue application running in the SBIO shall reset its state machine.

If no SBIO application is found in the object, the SBIR is notified of the error and closes the communication.

3.2.1. Select Application Command

Field	Value	Size	Description
CLA	<code>h00</code>	1	ISO/IEC 7816-4: SELECT Instruction, direct selection by DF Name
INS	<code>hA4</code>	1	
P1	<code>h04</code>	1	
P2	<code>h00</code>	1	
L_c	<code>h10</code>	1	Length of the DF Name
DataIn	<code>hA0 h00 h00 h06 h14 h53 h70 h72 h69 h6E h67 h42 h6C h75 h65 h30</code>	16	DF Name: SpringCard's registered application provider ID + ID of the SpringBlue application
L_E	<code>h00</code>	0 or 1	The L_E byte is optional in NFC mode. It shall be absent in BLE mode.

3.2.2. Select Application Response

a. Success

Field	Value	Size	Description
DataOut		0 - ?	Don't care
SW	<code>h90 h00</code>	2	Status Word – success

b. Error

Field	Value	Size	Description
SW	<code>h6x hxx</code>	2	Status Word – error. See § 3.5

3.3. EXCHANGE CHALLENGES

This 2nd exchange has two roles:

1. Transmit to the SBIO the SBIR's Challenge (random number) that will be used to secure the UserID in the 3rd exchange,
2. Transmit to the SBIR the SBIO's Challenge (random number) that will be used to protect the ObjectID in the 3rd exchange.

3.3.1. Exchange Challenges Command

<i>Field</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Size</i>	<i>Description</i>
CLA	$\text{h}00$	1	ISO/IEC 7816-4 default CLA
INS	$\text{h}86$	1	Custom Exchange Challenges Instruction
P1	$\text{h}00$	1	RFU – must be $\text{h}00$
P2	$\text{h}00$	1	RFU – must be $\text{h}00$
L_c	$\text{h}08$	1	Length of the data
DataIn	SBIR's Challenge	8	SBIR's Challenge on 8 bytes
L_E	$\text{h}00$	0 or 1	The L_E byte is optional in NFC mode. It shall be absent in BLE mode.

3.3.2. Exchange Challenges Response

a. Success

<i>Field</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Size</i>	<i>Description</i>
DataOut	SBIO's Challenge	8	SBIO's Challenge on 8 bytes
SW	$\text{h}90 \text{ h}00$	2	Status Word – success

b. Error

<i>Field</i>	<i>Value</i>	<i>Size</i>	<i>Description</i>
SW	$\text{h}6x \text{ h}xx$	2	Status Word – error. See § 3.5

3.4. SELECT SITE

This 3rd and last exchange has two roles:

1. Tell the SBIO which company or scheme the SBIR belongs to (SiteID parameter).
2. Return the SBIO's ObjectID and UserID to the SBIR in a secure cryptogram.

To address privacy concerns, the SBIO shall always return a "success" response. If the SBIO doesn't have a valid SiteID/UserID record for the SiteID selected by the SBIR, it shall generate a random response of the expected length (32 bytes).

3.4.1. Select Site Command

Field	Value	Size	Description
CLA	$\text{h}00$	1	ISO/IEC 7816-4: SELECT Instruction, select child DF
INS	$\text{h}A4$	1	
P1	$\text{h}01$	1	
P2	$\text{h}00$	1	
L _C	$\text{h}04$	1	Length of the data
DataIn	SiteID	4	SiteID on 4 bytes
L _E	$\text{h}00$	0 or 1	The L _E byte is optional in NFC mode. It shall be absent in BLE mode.

3.4.2. Select Site Response

a. Success – SiteID/UserID record exists in the SBIO

Field	Value	Size	Description
DataOut	Secure cryptogram	32	See chapter 4 for details
SW	$\text{h}90 \text{ h}00$	2	Status Word – success

b. Success – No such SiteID/UserID record in the SBIO

Field	Value	Size	Description
DataIn	Random data	32	
SW	$\text{h}90 \text{ h}00$	2	Status Word – success

c. Error

Field	Value	Size	Description
SW	$\text{h}6\text{x } \text{hXX}$	2	Status Word – error. See § 3.5

3.5. LISTING OF STATUS WORDS

The SpringBlue application running in the SBO may returns only Status Words taken from the list below. The operating system of the SBO is likely to return different Status Words if the application is not present or not reachable.

SW1	SW2	Meaning
$\text{h}90$	$\text{h}00$	Success
$\text{h}67$	$\text{h}00$	Wrong length (L_C is not coherent with DataIn)
$\text{h}69$	$\text{h}85$	Condition of use not satisfied (example: no Exchange Challenge before Select Site)
$\text{h}6A$	$\text{h}80$	Incorrect parameters in DataIn
$\text{h}6B$	$\text{h}00$	Wrong parameter P1-P2
$\text{h}6C$	$\text{h}00$	Wrong length L_E (present and not $\text{h}00$)
$\text{h}6D$	$\text{h}00$	INstruction not supported
$\text{h}6E$	$\text{h}00$	CLAss not supported

4. SECURE TRANSMISSION OF THE OBJECTID AND UserID

4.1. BASIS

The SBIO's response to the SBIR's Select Site command is a secure cryptogram containing the ObjectID and the UserID. Only a genuine SBIR (i.e. a SBIR knowing the Site's MSUK and SOIK) is able to recover these data.

The construction of this response is shown in Illustration 3 below.




Illustration 3: Construction of the Secure cryptogram

NB: The SBIO knows only its OSUK. The SBIR computes OSUK from MSUK and the ObjectID.

4.2. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SBIR

4.2.1. SBIR's constants

The SBIR has no constant value involved in the transaction.

4.2.2. SBIR's configuration data

The SBIR stores one configuration triplet consisting of

- SiteID,
- Site's ObjectID Key (SOIK),
- Master Key to protect Site's UserIDs (MSUK).

The SOIK and MSUK are stored in the SBIR's SAM. All AES operations are performed within the SAM.

4.2.3. Transaction handling

When the SBIR connects to a SBIO and starts a transaction, the SBIR runs the following algorithm:

1. Generate an 8-byte **SBIR's Challenge**, transmit it to the SBIO, and retrieve the 8-byte **SBIO's Challenge**,
2. Assemble the 16-byte value **Challenges = SBIR's Challenge .. SBIO's Challenge**,
3. Transmit its **SiteID** to the SBIO, and receive the 32-byte Secure cryptogram from the SBIO in response,
4. Decipher the first half of the Secure cryptogram using **SOIK** (AES ECB decrypt),
5. XOR this deciphered first half with **Challenges** to retrieve **ObjectID**,
6. Compute SBIO's **OSUK** by ciphering the **ObjectID** with **MSUK** (AES ECB encrypt),
7. Decipher the second half of the Secure cryptogram using this computed **OSUK** (AES ECB decrypt),
8. XOR this deciphered second half with **Challenges** to retrieve **SiteID .. UserID .. CRC**,
9. Verify that the **SiteID** received in the deciphered buffer is equal to the expected **SiteID**,
10. Verify that the **CRC** in the deciphered buffer is valid,
11. Extract the **UserID** from the deciphered buffer – and forward it to the downstream system.

The pseudo-unique ObjectID is never exposed to the downstream system. Only the UserID is significant.

4.3. IMPLEMENTATION IN THE SBIO

4.3.1. SBIO's constants

The SBIO is identified by one constant: the ObjectID, a 16-byte value.

The ObjectID must be physically associated to one particular device, tying every diversified key (OSUK) to a very object.

The implementer is responsible for providing a pseudo-unique ObjectID for the objects he releases. The ObjectID doesn't pretend to be unique, but collisions should be made as unlikely as possible.

A possible algorithms to do so could be:

ObjectID = Hash (Implementer-defined seed .. Mobile phone's IMEI)

Any cryptographic hash function could be used: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256... MD5 directly provides a 16-B output; for the other functions, the output has to be truncated.

4.3.2. SBIO's configuration data

The SBIO stores configuration quartets consisting of

- SiteID,
- Site's ObjectID Key (SOIK),
- Object + Site's UserID Key (OSUK).
- UserID.

The SBIO may store any number of quartets – but only one quartet per SiteID.

The SOIK and OSUK are sensitive data, and shall be stored in the SBIO's protected storage.

The quartet are typically delivered by a management service. Chapter 5 provides an overview of this concept.

The CRC32 of (SiteID .. UserID) could be processed once for all when the data are loaded and stored with the configuration quartet. It could even be computed by the server when delivering the quartet.

4.3.3. Transaction handling

When the SBIR connects to the SBIO and starts a transaction, the SBIO shall:

1. Receive the 8-byte **SBIR's Challenge**, generate an 8-byte **SBIO's Challenge**, and transmit it in response,

2. Assemble the 16-byte value **Challenges = SBIR's Challenge .. SBIO's Challenge**,
3. Receive the **SiteID** requested by the SBIO, find the corresponding quartet in its configuration data,
4. Assemble the 32-byte value **ObjectID .. SiteID .. UserID .. CRC (SiteID .. UserID)**,
5. XOR both 16-byte halves with **Challenges**,
6. Cipher the 16-byte first half with **SOIK** (AES ECB encrypt),
7. Cipher the 16-byte second half with **OSUK** (AES ECB encrypt),
8. Transmit this 32-byte Secure cryptogram to the SBIR.

4.3.4. Exception: unknown Site

If the SiteID requested by the SBIR is unknown from the SBIO, the procedure changes at step 4: the SBIO assemble a 32-byte random value, and transmits it instead of the 32-byte Secure cryptogram.

A SBIR actually belonging to the Site will understand that the SBIO doesn't have any suitable data because its verifications will fails (SiteID, CRC).

A rogue SBIR is not able to distinguish between SBIO returning valid data and a SBIR returning a random value.

5. MANAGEMENT TASKS (INFORMATIVE ONLY)

Implementing the SpringBlue ID scheme in a smartphone application is not enough to offer a ready-to-deploy, user-friendly SpringBlue ID Service. The implementer shall also take in account:

- How the application will be deployed into a fleet of smartphones,
- How, once installed, the application will be commissioned, receiving its configuration quartet (SiteID, SOIK, OSUK and UserID), where OSUK depends on the smartphone's ObjectID, for every site the smartphone's user has to be recognized on,
- How the application could be decommissioned (configuration quartet removed) if the smartphone is lost, or if the smartphone's user is no longer allowed to use the service.

The Management Tasks and how they are implemented fell out of the scope of this document. Typically, an implementer would offer a cloud-based management service. At least, this cloud service is responsible to identify and manage the users, and deliver the configuration quartets going into their smartphones..

To prevent any security issue, the communication between the application and the server shall be secured, and the user's credentials carefully verified.

6. NFC IMPLEMENTATION

The SBIR is a PCD. The SBIR is a PICC. The exchanges are directly implemented using the ISO/IEC 14443-4 "T=CL" half-duplex block communication protocol.




Illustration 4: NFC implementation of the SpringBlue transaction

7. BLE IMPLEMENTATION

The SBIR is configured as a BLE Peripheral. It broadcast regularly its advertising data, which allows a BLE Central – i.e., the SBIO – to find it.

The SBIR is a GATT server. The SBIO connects to the SBIR and is able to read or write the characteristics exposed through its GATT.




Illustration 5: BLE implementation of the SpringBlue transaction

7.1. MAPPING OF COMMANDS/RESPONSES INTO BLE READ/WRITE FRAMES

Technically speaking, the communication master/slave roles are inverted between BLE and NFC: when the SBIR wants to send a command to the SBIO, the SBIR only notifies the SBIO that a new command is available, and it's up to the SBIO to read the command. BLE indications are used to do so. In Illustration 5, every left-to-right arrow (**command SBIR to SBIO**) inside the "SpringBlue transaction" block is actually a 3-step sequence:

- SBIR sends an **indication**,
- SBIO sends a **read request**,
- SBIR sends a **read response**, containing the command buffer.

The SBIO sends back its response by writing into the SBIR. Again in Illustration 5, every right-to-left arrow (**response SBIO to SBIR**) inside the "SpringBlue transaction" block is actually a 2-step sequence:

- SBIO sends a **write request**, containing the response buffer,
- SBIR sends an **acknowledge**.

The communication takes place in unpaired, unbound mode. The security is implemented at application level, not at communication level.

7.2. ADVERTISEMENT DATA OF THE SBIR

7.2.1. Advertisement frame

Descriptor #1			Descriptor #2		
Len	Type	Data	Len	Type	Data
h02	h01	h05	h11	h16	h93 F5 A4 62 15 6F 41 B8 B8 18 58 BB D3 6F BD CD
Flags Record		- LE Limited Discoverable Mode - No BR/EDR (BLE only)	Incomplete list of 128-bit Service Class UUIDs Record		UUID of the SpringBlue ID Service

7.2.2. Scan response frame

None.

7.3. GATT PROFILE OF THE SBIR

7.3.1. Standard services and characteristics

UUID	Mnemonic	Description	Access
Generic Attribute			
1801			
	org.bluetooth.service.generic_attribute		
2A05			Read, Indicate
	org.bluetooth.characteristic.gatt.service_changed		
		Notifies the BLE central that the GATT should be read again	
Generic Access Profile			
1800			
	org.bluetooth.service.generic_access		
2A00			Read
	org.bluetooth.characteristic.gap.device_name		
		The name of the SBIR: "SpringBlue"	
Device Information			
180A			
	org.bluetooth.service.device_information		
2A29			Read
	org.bluetooth.characteristic.manufacturer_name_string		
		"SpringCard"	
2A24			Read
	org.bluetooth.characteristic.model_number_string		
		Depend on the actual SBIR product	
2A25			Read
	org.bluetooth.characteristic.serial_number_string		
		The BT_ADDR, in hex	
2A28			Read
	org.bluetooth.characteristic.firmware_revision_string		
		Version of the SBIR's firmware (currently "1.00")	

UUID	Mnemonic	Description	Access
<i>Device information (cont.)</i>			
2A05		org.bluetooth.characteristic.software_revision_string Version of the SBIR implementation (currently "1.00")	Read
Tx Power			
1804		org.bluetooth.service.tx_power	
2A07		org.bluetooth.characteristic.tx_power_level The (estimated) transmit power level in dBm, and the level ranges from -100 dBm to +20 dBm, with a resolution of 1 dBm.	Read

7.3.2. SpringBlue service and characteristic

UUID	Mnemonic	Description	Access
SpringBlue Service			
93F5A462-165F-41B8-B818-58BBD36FBDCD			
9C38A319-F06F-4DD3-AEE4-42747A7307E		SpringBlue APDU Exchange characteristic Single characteristic used for bi-directional communication. The SBIO shall register to receive the indications on this characteristic.	Read, Write, Indicate

7.4. FORMAT OF THE SPRINGBLUE APDU EXCHANGE CHARACTERISTIC

The SpringBlue APDU Exchange characteristic is bi-directional and conveys both the commands and the response. The format of the exchanges has been designed to comply with early and lightweight BLE stacks (Bluetooth 4.0 "smart"). Therefore, this characteristic is limited to a 20-B only MTU. A chaining is implemented to support commands or responses involving more than 20 bytes.

7.4.1. Read Command (SBIR to SBIO)

The SBIR commands (C-APDU) are in the form **CLA INS P1 P2 L_c [DataIn]**.

The total length of the C-APDU can easily be determined by the receiver thanks to **L_c**; therefore, the C-APDU could be transmitted "as is" in the BLE characteristic.

If the C-APDU doesn't fit into a single 20-B frame, chaining is used: the SBIR transmits every chunk one after the other.

NB: providing a L_E byte at the end of the C-APDU is forbidden in BLE mode.

7.4.2. Write Response (SBIO to SBIR)

The SBIO response (R-APDU) are in the form **[DataOut] SW1 SW2**.

There's no information regarding the length of the response within the R-APDU itself; therefore, the SBIO shall prefix its R-APDU with a length byte denoted L_R (length of response).

The actual SBIO response then becomes: L_R **[DataOut] SW1 SW2**.

L_R is the length of the response, including **SW1** and **SW2** and excluding the L_R byte. **DataOut** may have any length between 0 and 125 bytes, and as a consequence $2 \leq L_R \leq 127$.

If the R-APDU is too long to fit in a single frame, chaining is used: the SBIO transmits every chunk one after the other.

7.4.3. Write ATR (SBIO to SBIR)

When connecting to the SBIR, the SBIO is responsible to transmit (write) the first frame, so the SBIR knows the connecting device is probably a SBIO, and not a generic BLE explorer application.

This first frame shall be the constant:

12 3B 8E 01 80 5C 53 70 72 69 6E 67 42 6C 75 65 30 31 5D

NB: the first byte, $_{h}12$ i.e. 18 in decimal, is the L_R .

8. TEST VECTORS

SiteID	00 00 00 01
SOIK	A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 AA AB AC AD AE AF
MSUK	B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9 BA BB BC BD BE BF

8.1. OBJECT 1

ObjectID	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
OSUK	EE 7D 47 E0 14 34 B2 D4 0C 4B B2 DE C7 0D 60 36
UserID	01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
CRC32 (SiteID .. UserID)	36 46 85 80
SiteID .. UserID .. CRC	00 00 00 01 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 36 46 85 80

8.1.1. Transaction 1

SBIR's Challenge	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
SBIO's Challenge	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Challenges	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ObjectID XOR Challenges	00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 0A 0B 0C 0D 0E 0F
Secure cryptogram, 1 st half	14 66 75 2C 7F 15 97 22 B2 41 0A 6A 94 87 55 38
(SiteID .. UserID .. CRC) XOR Challenges	00 00 00 01 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 36 46 85 80
Secure cryptogram, 2 nd half	18 C9 81 9C 96 49 29 48 63 79 BF 85 A1 27 E6 49

8.1.2. Transaction 2

SBIR's Challenge	C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
SBIO's Challenge	C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
Challenges	C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
ObjectID XOR Challenges	C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0 C0
Secure cryptogram, 1 st half	4E AC FA 75 0B 5E 26 96 73 85 EF 26 F0 3E B3 74
(SiteID .. UserID .. CRC) XOR Challenges	C0 C1 C2 C2 C5 C7 C5 C3 CD CF CD C3 FA 8B 4B 4F
Secure cryptogram, 2 nd half	EF F8 FC 69 1F 0A A2 E8 56 8D BC 60 5A A5 E2 1D

8.1.3. Transaction 3

SBIR's Challenge	C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
SBIO's Challenge	C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
Challenges	C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
ObjectID XOR Challenges	C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8 C8
Secure cryptogram, 1 st half	7D 9F DF 17 6F 05 E0 62 9E 79 5E 6F C7 E0 14 EF
(SiteID .. UserID .. CRC) XOR Challenges	C8 C9 CA CA CD CF CD CB C5 C7 C5 CB F2 83 43 47
Secure cryptogram, 2 nd half	B5 33 8F 15 17 69 CA 00 2F 6B 72 E3 B4 5F CF 52

8.2. OBJECT 2

ObjectID	E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 EA EB EC ED EE EF
OSUK	07 81 30 BD E0 67 8B 0B 61 31 A8 8A 45 2E CC D0
UserID	F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7
CRC32 (SiteID .. UserID)	DD 36 74 DB
SiteID .. UserID .. CRC	00 00 00 01 F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 DD 36 74 DB

8.2.1. Transaction 1

SBIR's Challenge	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
SBIO's Challenge	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Challenges	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ObjectID XOR Challenges	E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 EA EB EC ED EE EF
Secure cryptogram, 1 st half	7E B6 C4 59 63 FB 48 A3 DE 5B CB ED 7E B8 FD 2D
(SiteID .. UserID .. CRC) XOR Challenges	00 00 00 01 F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 DD 36 74 DB
Secure cryptogram, 2 nd half	17 47 84 CC 5E AC 51 F7 94 60 93 7F 61 A8 B6 38

8.2.2. Transaction 2

SBIR's Challenge	C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
SBIO's Challenge	C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
Challenges	C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
ObjectID XOR Challenges	20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Secure cryptogram, 1 st half	53 A0 73 AB 6A C4 8A 77 9B 14 65 EC 6A 3A 47 20
(SiteID .. UserID .. CRC) XOR Challenges	C0 C1 C2 C2 34 34 34 34 3C 3C 3C 3C 11 FB BA 14
Secure cryptogram, 2 nd half	81 BC 08 55 EF 72 89 C0 E2 A1 73 4A 10 8E F4 D4

8.2.3. Transaction 3

SBIR's Challenge	C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF
SBIO's Challenge	C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
Challenges	C8 C9 CA CB CC CD CE CF C0 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7
ObjectID XOR Challenges	28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Secure cryptogram, 1 st half	8C C5 D5 1E 4D E8 51 76 7B 6F E0 CB 9A 75 87 8D
(SiteID .. UserID .. CRC) XOR Challenges	C8 C9 CA CA 3C 3C 3C 3C 34 34 34 34 19 F3 B2 1C
Secure cryptogram, 2 nd half	1E 5F 9E 65 C5 1F 30 F9 04 8F 50 64 B4 8B 11 BC

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EDITOR'S INFORMATION

SPRINGCARD SAS company with a capital of 227 000 €

RCS EVRY B 429 665 482

Parc Gutenberg, 2 voie La Cardon

91120 Palaiseau – FRANCE

CONTACT INFORMATION

For more information and to locate our sales office or distributor in your country or area, please visit

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